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Workers' Compensation. Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Com-
pany, 659 A.2d 662 (R.I. 1995). Section 9-1-33 of Rhode Island
General Laws held not to apply to actions by employees against a
workers' compensation carrier.
Under section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island General Laws:
"[E]very [workers' compensation] policy shall cover the entire lia-
bility of the employer under... [the Workers' Compensation Act]
and shall contain an agreement by the insurer to the effect that the
insurer shall be directly and primarily liable to the employee.. .. "-
In addition, section 9-1-33 states that "an Insured under any insur-
ance policy... may bring an action against the insurer... when it
is alleged that said insurer wrongfully and in bad faith refused to
pay or settle a claim... or otherwise wrongfully and in bad faith
refused to timely perform its obligations under said contract of in-
surance."2 In Cianci, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island deter-
mined that the term "insured," as used within the context of
section 9-1-33, was attributable only to an employer and not to an
employee, and that an employee could not maintain a third party
claim under the statute3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Raymond Cianci ("Cianci") was the owner and employee of Ray
Cianci, Inc. ("Employer"). 4 The employer had contracted with Na-
1. Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 659 A.2d 662, 665 (R.I. 1995);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-36-5, G.L. 1956 (1986 Reenactment) provides:
Every policy shall cover the entire liability of the employer under chapters
29 - 38 of this title, and shall contain an agreement by the insurer to the
effect that the insurer shall be directly and primarily liable to the em-
ployee and, in the event of his death, to his or her dependents, to pay to
him, her, or them the compensation, if any, for which the employer is
liable.
2. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 665 (quoting R.I. Gen. Law § 9-1-33 (a) G.L. 1956
(1994 Reenactment)) which provides:
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, an insured under any insurance
policy as set out in the general laws or otherwise may bring an action
against the insurer issuing said policy, when it is alleged said insurer
wrongfully and in bad faith refused to pay or settle a claim made pursu-
ant to the provisions of said policy, or otherwise wrongfully and in bad
faith refused to timely perform its obligations under said contract of
insurance...
3. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 666.
4. Id. at 663.
SURVEY SECTION
tionwide Insurance Company ("Nationwide") for workers' compen-
sation insurance coverage.5 On September 19, 1983, during the
course of his employment, Cianci sustained burns and was hospi-
talized.6 Cianci filed a claim with Nationwide to compensate him
for his injuries and workers' compensation benefits were paid with-
out contest.
7
In 1989, Cianci began to experience problems with his liver.8
He sought coverage from Nationwide alleging that his liver
problems were a result of the transfusions he had received in con-
nection with his burn accident.9 Cianci also claimed that he had
contracted Hepatitis C from the transfusions. 10 Nationwide de-
nied these claims on the grounds that there existed no causal rela-
tionship between the blood transfusions and Cianci's liver
damage. 1
In May 1990, Cianci filed a petition with the Rhode Island
Workers' Compensation Court to amend the description of his prior
burn injuries to include the liver problem.' 2 In July 1990, Cianci
underwent a liver transplant.' 3 On November 21, 1991, the Work-
ers' Compensation Court granted Cianci's petition to amend and
ordered payment of his medical bills related to the liver injury.' 4
Nationwide did not appeal the decision. 15
On June 2, 1993, Cianci filed a complaint in the United States
District Court against Nationwide. 16 Cianci alleged breach of con-
tract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
fiduciary duties, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 7
Nationwide filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction' 8 and for failure to state a claim' 9 because it did not con-
5. Id. at 664.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted).
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sider the plaintiff to be an insured under section 9-1-33.20 The
motion was referred to the United States Magistrate who recom-
mended dismissal.21 Cianci objected to this recommendation and a
United States District Court judge ordered Cianci and Nationwide
to prepare facts and issues for certification by the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island.22
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island legislature enacted sections 9-1-33 and 28-
36-5 to delineate the responsibilities of the insurer to the employer
and the employee. 23 In the event that a conflict occurs between the
insured and the insurer, the statutes allow for claims to be made
against the insurer.24
More specifically, section 9-1-33 permits an insured to file
claims against an insurance carrier when it is alleged that the car-
rier "wrongfully and in bad faith refused to pay or settle a claim
. . ." or wrongfully refuses to timely perform its contractual obliga-
tions.25 However, the statute fails to define the term insured.
Thus, the primary issue before the Court in Cianci was the defini-
tion of insured.26
Section 28-36-5 states that every policy will contain an agree-
ment by which the employee may claim against the insurance car-
rier for compensation for which the employer is liable.2 7 This
section does not use the word, "insured", but rather refers specifi-
cally to employee. 28
20. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 664; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-33.
21. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 664.
22. Id.
23. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-1-33 and 28-36-5, G.L. 1956 (1986 Reenactment); See,
eg., Bitgood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 A.2d 1001 (R.I. 1984); Mustapha v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F.Supp. 890 (D.R.I. 1967).
24. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-33, G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment); see supra note 2.
25. Id.
26. 659 A.2d 662.
27. Id.
28. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 665-666 (holding that the liability of the employer is
put on the insurer, but that does not mean that the employee becomes the
insured).
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ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the "Legisla-
ture, in explicitly restricting the right to sue for a bad-faith refusal
to pay a claim to an 'insured,' intended section 9-1-33 to apply only
to those claimants who meet the technical insurance contract
meaning" of the term.29 Because the plaintiff was not a party to
the contract, he was not an insured under the statute, and cannot
pursue a claim under section 9-1-33.30
In reaching its decision, the court analyzed the language of
sections 9-1-33 and 28-36-5. The court recognized that section 28-
36-5 uses the term "employer" rather than "insured" when refer-
ring to the employer. 31 Section 9-1-3332 uses the term "insured,"
but does not refer to "employer" or "employee."33 The court ac-
knowledged that section 28-36-534 equates the liability of the em-
ployer and insurer but it does not equate the employee with the
employer as insureds. 35 As a result, the court noted section 28-36-
5 is not helpful in determining the intent of the legislature in sec-
tion 9-1-33. 36
The court next examined the definition of insured in Colo-
rado's Workers' Compensation statute.87 In Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Savio,38 the Colorado Supreme Court examined language in the
Colorado Workers' Compensation Act which is similar to the lan-
guage in section 9-1-3339 and equated an employee with an in-
sured.40 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island distinguished
Savio41 from the instant case on the basis that; (1) Savio was con-
sidered a first-party claim for benefits and (2) Savio never con-
cluded that an employee was an insured.42 Thus, Savio could not
help dispose of the issue.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. R.I. Gen. Law § 28-36-5, G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment).
32. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-33, G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment).
33. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 665.
34. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-36-5 (1956, 1986 Reenactment).
35. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 666.
36. Id.
37. Id; See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-40-101 et seq (West 1990).
38. 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985).
39. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-33, G;L.1956 (1986 Reenactment).
40. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 666; see also, Savio, 706 P.2d at 1272.
41. Savio, 706 P.2d at 1258.
42. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 666.
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The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ultimately based its deci-
sion on the relationship of the parties to the insurance contract.
The court recognized that the employee is not a party43 to the con-
tract and thus, must be considered a "third-party beneficiary."44
Because section 9-1-3345 uses the term "insured" specifically, the
court "believed" that the Legislature intended that term to refer
only to the "technical insurance-contract meaning of the term."46
As a result, the court held that Cianci could not pursue a claim
under section 9-1-33 because he was a third-party beneficiary, not
an insured.47
The court went on to hold that any obligation to deal in good
faith runs solely to the employer.48 Therefore, the employee may
not maintain a third-party claim against the insurer for failure to
deal in good faith. 49 In addition, the court stated that the relation-
ship between the employee and the insurer is most likely an adver-
sarial relationship, one which carries no duty on the part of either
party to deal in good faith.50
Lastly, the court further clarified its position that there is no
intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions51 of the
Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Act.52 In resolving this as-
pect of Cianci's claim, the court noted that "[w]orkers' compensa-
tion benefits are meant as full compensation for any loss or harm
that is alleged to have been caused by any entity to which immu-
nity from suit is extended under section 28-29-20. 53 As such, an
employee covered under the workers' compensation act has no
cause of action against the insurance carrier "because the act ex-
pressly immunizes the carrier from liability under any common
43. The Court notes that a party to the insurance contract is one who partici-
pates in the making of the contract and its terms. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 666.
44. Id.
45. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-33, G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment).
46. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 666.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 667.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The exclusivity provisions state that the an employee's remedies for work
related injuries are restricted to those within the Workers' Compensation Act. R.I.
Gen. Laws § 28-29-17, G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment).
52. Cianci, 659 A.2d. at 668.
53. Id. at 669 (quoting DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40, 42 (R.I.
1992)).
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law suit."54 This final holding grants the insurance carrier of the
employer the same protections afforded the employer by the Act.55
CONCLUSION
As a result of the court's holding in Cianci, section 9-1-33 is
interpreted as pertaining solely to the parties of the insurance con-
tract, namely the employer and the carrier. Although this inter-
pretation is justified and in complete conformity with the letter of
the statute, the result is that a mistreated employee's only avail-
able remedies fall under the purview of the workers' compensation
court.
Scott C. Baer
54. Cianci, 659 A.2d at 669-70.
55. Id. at 668.
